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Control,  coordination and conflict 
on international commodity 
markets 
Willem van Groenendaai and Aart de Zeeuw 
The effects of price stabilization policies have  been  investigated jor both  theoretical 
and empirical models. The institutional construct  for international commodity markets 
is that a buffer stock manager employs a band width rule or a price adjustment rule 
to  stabilize  the  world market price.  In  those  investigations  it  is assumed  that  the 
other  market participants  do  not  react  to  the  stabilization  activities  of the  buffer 
stock  manager.  This  paper  describes  an  international  commodity  market  as  a 
difference game between buffer stock manager, producing  countries and consuming 
countries  and uses  an  empirical model for  the  worm cocoa  market  to  analyse  the 
effects.  The feedback Nash behavioural equilibrium  for this game is compared with 
the  optimal  control  outcome  which  ignores  the  strategic  behaviour  in  producing 
countries and consuming countries.  It is jound that producers and consumers engage 
in storage  activities  which  have  a negative effect on  the stabilization  efforts of the 
buffer  stock  manager  but  which  decrease  the  operating  costs  of the  buffer  stock, 
decrease  the revenues  of the producers and decrease  the costs of consumers. 
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International  commodity agreements  which  aim  for 
price and revenue stabilization are a major policy issue 
at meetings  of UNCTAD.  Especially during  the  last 
conferences the main if not only objective formulated 
in the agreements has been price stabilization around a 
long-term trend  (see eg UNCTAD  [22]).  The desir- 
ability  of price  stabilization  has  been  an  important 
theoretical issue in the economic literature for a  long 
time,  Turnovsky  [21]  surveys  and  extends  the 
Waugh  Oi-Massell  analysis.  Prices  are  random 
because  of  stochastic  fluctuations  in  demand  and 
supply. The criteria for judging the desirability of price 
stabilization are the expected producers' surplus  and 
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the expected consumers' surplus. The main conclusion 
of  the  Waugh  Oi  Massell-Turnovsky  analysis  is 
that the source of the fluctuations determines whether 
the  surplus  improves or  deteriorates.  In general  the 
sum of the surpluses ie total welfare improves. Newbery 
and  Stiglitz  [17]  argue  that  the  market  is  in  fact 
competitive  and  complete  because  future  and  risk 
markets are redundant.  This implies that the market 
equilibrium  is  Pareto  efficient,  so  that  the  optimal 
stabilizing policy is to reproduce the storage decisions 
of risk  neutral  competitive speculators  with  rational 
price  forecasts.  Turnovsky  [21]  and  Newbery  and 
Stiglitz  [17]  emphasize that  perfect price stability is 
either  not  feasible  or  infinitely  costly.  It is  better to 
analyse  partial  adjustment  policies  or  the  optimal 
degree of price stabilization. 
In the literature  two types of stabilization  policies 
are distinguished. The first is a band width rule, which 
means that the stabilizing agency intervenes when the 
price moves above or below an a priori specified price 
band.  This  is  the  sort  of  rule  that  is  suggested  in 
international commodity agreements and it is referred 
to  by  Newbery  and  Stiglitz  [17]  as  the  pragmatic 
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approach. The second is a price adjustment rule which 
means that the stabilizing agency is constantly trying 
to keep the price  as  close  as possible  to an a  priori 
specified target price path. This is the sort of rule that 
also results from an optimal control approach to the 
stabilization problem. 
Lee and Blandford [16]  use empirical models for 
the world cocoa and copper markets and perform an 
optimal  control  analysis  for  price  and  revenue 
stabilization. They stress the need to take account of 
the systematic trend of the price in setting the target 
price path because otherwise the attempts to stabilize 
are doomed to fail. Their conclusion is that it is likely 
to require substantial market intervention to produce 
a  significant reduction in price  instability, although 
price  stability can have a  favourable impact on the 
level  and  stability  of producers'  revenues.  Ghosh, 
Gilbert and Hughes Hallett [10]  construct a  model 
of the  world  copper  market  in  which  the  market 
clearing  identity  is  replaced  with  an  explicit  price 
formation mechanism. They compare band width rules 
with optimal control results and conclude that band 
width  rules  are  no  match  for  optimal  stabilization 
schemes.  Hughes Hallett [13]  explores the problem 
further.  The  conclusion  is  again  that  significant 
stabilization of the copper market is possible but very 
expensive. However, in contrast with Lee and Blandford 
[16]  there  is  now  no  improvement in  the  level  of 
producers' earnings, although the variability can be 
reduced substantially. This is in line with the theoretical 
results that are reported in Turnovsky [21]. 
Turnovsky [21]  and  Newbery  and  Stiglitz  [17] 
raise the question of what the impact of the actions of 
the stabilizing authority on private speculative storage 
might be and whether the actions of  private speculators 
might  jeopardize  the  desired  outcome.  Lee  and 
Blandford [ 16] and Hughes Hallett [ 13] also emphasize 
the assumption in their exercise that the behaviour of 
market  participants  is  unaffected  by  buffer  stock 
stabilization.  The  Lucas  critique  argues  that  this 
assumption is not realistic and might lead to the wrong 
policy advice.  This  paper  therefore suggests  using a 
difference game approach instead of an optimal control 
approach.  In  this  way it  is  possible  to  study what 
happens  when  producers  and  consumers  can  also 
employ storage activities  in reaction to buffer  stock 
activities  and when the buffer stock manager realizes 
this. It must be stressed  that the Lucas critique is not 
completely resolved in this way because other behaviour 
is kept fixed in the model. The storage behaviour of 
the buffer stock manager, producers and consumers is 
modelled  as  an  optimal  control  problem  and  the 
strategic  interaction  is  modelled  as  a  game.  It  is 
suggested  that the feedback Nash or subgame perfect 
equilibrium  concept  should  be  employed  in  this 
difference  game.  An  algorithm  which  leads  to  this 
equilibrium is given by de Zeeuw [24]. In this paper 
an empirical model for the world cocoa market is used 
which is based on a model developed in van Groenendaal 
and Vingerhoets [ 12]. This model consists of estimated 
equations for production and consumption and  for 
several price indices. 
The optimal stabilization policy of the buffer stock 
manager  based  on  an  optimal  control  approach  is 
compared with the Nash equilibrium between buffer 
stock manager, producing countries and consuming 
countries. The idea is that a  country modelled as a 
strategic agent represents all strategic activities within 
that country. In this Nash equilibrium the producing 
countries aim for higher export prices and the consuming 
countries aim for lower import prices. In the attempt 
to stabilize  the world market price  the buffer  stock 
manager is  restricted  by the  available buffer stock, 
which can never become negative.  In their attempt to 
get a better export price or import price the countries 
are restricted in their storage decisions by assumptions 
about the reasonable size of the stock. The conclusions 
are  that  both  producing  countries  and  consuming 
countries engage in storage activities which counteract 
the  stabilizing efforts of the  buffer  stock  manager, 
although this effect is small. The buffer stock can be 
successful  in  stabilizing  world  market  prices  and 
revenues  but there remains a conflict on the market 
which  calls for further coordination. It is interesting 
that the operating costs of the buffer stock decrease 
in  the  game  setting.  In  addition,  when  producing 
countries and  consuming countries are  both  active, 
producers are worse off whereas consumers are better 
off. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section 
presents  an  empirical  model  for  the  world  cocoa 
market. The following section gives algorithms for the 
optimal  control  solution  and  the  feedback  Nash 
behavioural equilibrium in a linear quadratic framework. 
The price stabilization problem is then formulated in 
the next section as an optimal control problem, when 
there is no speculation, and as a Nash difference game, 
when there is speculation. The algorithms given in the 
previous  section  are  applied  to  the  cocoa  model 
presented earlier and the results for the optimal control 
formulation and the Nash difference game formulation 
are compared. The last section offers conclusions. 
Cocoa model 
Cocoa beans are produced in underdeveloped and less 
developed countries and cocoa products are  mainly 
consumed in developed countries. This  implies  that 
the trade between producers and consumers is typically 
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Table  I.  Production." 
Z 
AQRt = #0 +  ~  #j + i( PFll PC), _j + #to QRt_,  + #,tHYt_  4 4- #12 t -~- #13 DU65 
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Country or 
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Rest of  Rest of  Asia and 
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0.98  1.89 
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0.38  0.14 
(2.8)  (2.4) 
0.18 
(2.1) 
0.17  0.05 
(2.7)  (I.6) 
0.06 
0.13  -0.31 
(2.1)  (-2.3) 
0.17  0.57  -  0.85  -  0.48 
(-2.2)  (-2.7)  (  3.7)  (  2.2) 
197.0 
(I.4) 
[tl 3  2.52 
t  (3.1) 
R 2  0.41  0.87  (I.86  0.93  0.22  0.45  0.60  0.57 
"In  addition  to  the  variables  mentioned  in  thc  second  section,  three other factors were introduced.  First, a  dummy  variable  DU65 for  the 
year  1965,  in which year the weather conditions  were extremely good.  Second,  a  variable HY  which represents a  change  in technology  due 
to  the  introduction of hybrids. Third, a  time trend t  for Asia and Oceania,  which reflects local  government  policy of increasing the acreage 
for cocoa  trees. 
h The  following restrictions were introduced: fl~  f12  and fl,~  fl,, + [;~ + fls. 
international trade between countries or regions. The 
structure  of the  model  reflects  this  observation.  The 
exports  and  imports  of intermediate  cocoa  products 
are  transformed  into cocoa  bean equivalents  so that 
cocoa  beans are  in fact  the only traded  goods.  Suan 
Tan ([20],  pp 71-83)  reviews  the theory  underlying 
the construction of this type of model.  The sampling 
period  is  in  principle  1960  82  and  most  of the data 
originate  from  FAO  Cocoa  Statistics  [6],  Gill  and 
Duffus  Cocoa  Market  Reports  [11]  and  the  ICCO 
Quarterly Bulletin  [ 14]. 
The producing countries or regions are Cameroon, 
Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, the rest of Africa, Brazil, 
the rest of South America and Asia and Oceania. The 
production of cocoa beans depends on the area planted 
and the average production per acre of land. Akiyama 
and  Duncan  [2]  therefore  use equations for acreage 
and for average production in their model.  However, 
since the data for acreage are not reliable (FAO  [9]), 
here only one equation for production is used. Under 
fairly  reasonable  assumptions  this is in any case  not 
a  severe  restriction  (Ady  [1],  Bateman  [4]).  The 
decision  on  a  change  in  production  is  based  on  the 
development (or adaptive expectation) of real producer 
prices,  PFI/PC,  as  an  indicator  of expected  profits. 
The resulting specification  is 
8 
AQR,=flo+  ~  flj+l(PFl/PC)t-j+fl,oQ  R,  , 
j=O 
(1) 
Table  1 gives  the estimation  results. 
The consuming regions are North America, Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe (including the USSR) and the 
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Table 2. Consumption: 
CC/ POP, = to  o +  mt(GNPRI  POP) t +  oJ2( PII PC) , 
+ ¢u3(PSIPC), +  a~4(CCIPOP)t -  I 
Country or  North  Western  Eastern  Rest of 
region  America  Europe  Europe  the world 
(o  0  0.70  0.30 
t  (4.3)  (2.9) 
(') 1  0.10  0.06  2.48  0.08 
t  (2.6)  (2.6)  (4.3)  (2.8) 
602  --0.17  --0.08  --0.38  --0.l 1 
t  (-2.9)  (-3.2)  (-4,3)  (-2.8) 
(o 3  -  0.35  -  0.13 
t  {-2.55)  (-1.8) 
(')4  0.78  0.49  0.30  0.51 
t  (7.1)  (3.9)  (1,6)  (3.1) 
R 2  0.78  0,77  0.78  0.82 
a For  Eastern  Europe  and  the  USSR  there  are  no  figures on  the 
price  of consumption.  PI  and  PS  were  therefore  used  instead  of 
relative prices. 
rest of the developed world. There is an especially large 
trade in intermediate cocoa products between North 
America and Brazil. Imports therefore consist of cocoa 
beans for grinding as well as powder, paste and butter 
transformed  into  cocoa  bean  equivalents.  Cocoa 
consumption per capita,  CC/POP, is  based  on  real 
gross  per  capita  income,  GNPR/POP, and  on  real 
cocoa prices. The real import price, PI/PC, is used to 
represent the real cocoa price. The real price of sugar, 
PS/PC, is introduced to account for possible substitution 
or complementary products. The resulting specification 
is 
(CC/POP)t = 0)0 + °91 (GNPR/POP), 
+ 0)2(PI/PC)t + 0) 3 (PS/PC), 
+ 0)4(CC/POP)t- 1  (2) 
Table 2 gives the estimation results. 
The producer prices,  PFI, are  expressed  in  home 
currency  and  the  export  prices,  PE,  in  US  dollars. 
Because of government policy and quality differences 
these  prices  are  not  simply  related  through  the 
exchange rates, RE. For the same reason export prices, 
PE, and import prices, PI, are not equal to the world 
market price, PICCO. For all these price equations an 
autoregressive distributed lag model of the first order 
was introduced. The resulting specifications are 
PI, = xl PICCO, + s:2PICCO  ,_ t + tc3PEt- 1  (5) 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 give the estimation results. 
The world market cocoa price, PICCO, depends on 
the  difference  between  world  supply  and  demand. 
Buffer stock operations, ABST, have a direct influence 
on  this  difference.  Supply,  ERWT,  sums  up  the 
production per country or region minus a change, AST, 
in stocks, which are held for strategic reasons in that 
country  or  region.  Demand,  IRWT,  sums  up  the 
demand for grindings per region plus the imports of 
cocoa bean equivalents plus a strategically held change, 
AST, in stocks.  Apart  from stocks held for strategic 
reasons it is also assumed that the consuming regions 
keep a fraction of the demand for grindings in stock 
for production of cocoa products.  This desired level 
of stocks is set equal to the average level of stocks over 
the period 1968  80 (0.225 x  IRWT). The definitional 
equation for total demand,  IRWT, also  includes  an 
autonomous component, CCRR, to account for imports 
in  countries  or  regions,  which  are  not  modelled 
explicitly. Differences in world supply and demand will 
also create changes, ASTWT, in free stocks of cocoa 
bean equivalents (the factor 0.99 accounts for transport 
losses).  These  free  stocks  will  influence  the  world 
market price in so far as they differ from the desired 
level of stocks. Changing demand will induce a change 
in the desired level of stocks (0.225 x AIRWT). This 
will  lead  to a  change  in  the demand for stocks  and 
therefore this term is added to demand, IRWT, in the 
specification for the world market cocoa price. Since 
markets  are  not  independent  the  commodity  price 
index, CPI, is included in the specification in order to 
separate the effect of differences in supply and demand 
on the cocoa market from the spill over effects from 
other markets. Indicators for the instability of monetary 
variables did not have any significant influence. The 
relevant  definitional  equations  and  the  resulting 








IRWTt =  ~  [CC,,+AST,] + CCRR,  (7) 
i=1 
PFIt=•IPE t x  REt+K2PEt_ 1 x  RE,_ 1 
+ ~c3PFI,- 1  (3) 
PEt = ~cl PICCOt + x2PICCOt- 1 + x3PEt- 1  (4) 
World stocks 
STWT  t = STWT,_ 1 + [0.99 x  ERWT  t 
-  IRWT  t-  ABST]  (8) 
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Table 3. Producer prices." 
PFI, =  xt PE t  x  REt +  KzPEt_  I  x  REt_  I +  KsPFlt_  1 
Country or  Rest of 
region  Cameroon  Ghana  Nigeria  Ivory Coast  Africa  Brazil 
h- I  0.05  0.18  0.07  0.12  0.74 
t  (1.8)  (5.7)  (I.1)  (2.6)  (20.3) 
h2  0.15  0.21  0.16  0.10  -0.45 
t  (3.6)  (2.6)  (2.2)  (1.2)  (-2.4) 
/'-'3  0.63  0.63  0.79  0.59  0.65  0.60 
t  (7.7)  (6.6)  (5.1)  (4.4)  (4.0)  (2.1) 
R 2  0.99  0.98  0.98  0.97  0.98  0.99 
Rest of  Asia and 
South America  Oceania 
a For the rest of South America and Asia and Oceania producer prices are not known. It is assumed that for these regions producer prices 
are equal to export prices in home currency: PFI = PE x  RE.  For the rest of Africa an index (1975 =  100) was used based on the sum of 
producer prices in US dollars, weighted by production. 
Table 4. Export prices. 
PEt = KI PICCOt + x2PICCOt- 1 + KsPEt- I 
Country or  Rest of  Rest of  Asia and 
region  Cameroon  Ghana  Nigeria  Ivory Coast  Africa  Brazil  South America  Oceania 
~,j  0.58  0.36  0.72  0.49  0.43  1.08  0.93  0.81 
t  (9.6)  (5.4)  (7.0)  (8.5)  (8.4)  (22.0)  (84.5)  (24.6) 
h2  0.32  0.62  0.38  0.43  -0.12  0.08 
t  (5.1)  (9.1)  (6.5)  (8.3)  (-2.4)  (2.5) 
K  s  0.17 
t  (1.4) 
8  2  0.98  0.98  0.92  0.98  0.98  0.99  0.99  0.99 
Table 5. Import prices. 
P!  t = K! PICCO, + tQ PICCO, _ I + I¢3PEt -  J 
Country or  North  Western  Eastern  Rest of the 
region  America  Europe  Europe  world 
h 1  0.54  0.56  0.54  0.74 
t  (ll.l)  (14.2)  t8.6)  (15.41 
~"2  0.51  0.36  0.50  0.32 
t  (10.4)  (9.0)  (7.7)  (6.5) 
1(3 
t 
R z  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
World  market  cocoa  price 
PICCO,  =  ~1 CP1, -  ~z [ ER WTt -  (1RWT~ 
+  0.225  x  AIRWT,)  -- ABST,] 
-ct3[STWTt  1-0.225xlRWTt-l] 
+  c(4PICCO,  1  (9) 
Table  6  gives the estimation  results. 
Table 6. World market cocoa  price,  a 
PICCO, =  ~l CPIt -  ~2[ ERWTt -  ( IRWTt + 0.225 × AIR WTt) ] 
-  ~3[STWTt _ j -  0.225 × IRWT  t _ 1  ] + ~4PICCOt -  J 
+ ~DU77 
Parameter  ~l  ~2  ~3  ~4  ~5  R2 
Value  0.85  0.22  0.06  0.71  145.29  0.97 
t  (3.1)  (3.6)  (2.0)  (6.5)  (6.4) 
"A  dummy  variable  DU77  for  the  year  1977 was  introduced  to 
account for the extreme increase in PICCO in that year. 
The global structure of the model  is as follows.  The 
non-controllable  exogenous  variables  are  the  com- 
modity  price indices,  PC,  for each  country  or region, 
real  income,  GNPR,  and  population  size,  POP,  for 
each  consuming  region,  an  autonomous  import 
component,  CCRR,  the general commodity  price index, 
CPI,  the price  index for  sugar,  PS,  and  the exchange 
rates,  RE.  The  instrumental  variables are  the change, 
ABST,  in  the  buffer  stock  and  the  changes,  AST,  in 
stocks for each country  or region. These instrumental 
variables  were  set  equal  to  zero  in  the  estimation 
procedures. The endogenous  variables are production, 
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QR, the producer price index, PFI, and the export price 
index,  PE,  for  each  producing  country  or  region, 
consumption, CC, and the import price index, PI, for 
each  consuming region,  total exports,  ERWT,  total 
imports,  IRWT,  free  stocks,  STWT,  and  the  world 
market  price  index,  PICCO.  Given  time  paths  for 
the  non-controllable  exogenous  variables  and  for 
the instrumental variables  the model generates time 
paths for the endogenous variables from an appropriate 
set  of  initial  values.  The  model  is  linear  in  the 
endogenous and instrumental variables. Non-linearities 
such  as  the  transformation  from  nominal  to  real 
variables  or from US  dollars  to  home currency are 
reflected in the time varying coefficients of an essentially 
linear model. 
In order to be able to apply control algorithms the 
model is rewritten in state space form. This means that 
the set of higher order difference equations is rewritten 
as a set of first order difference equations by stacking 
lagged endogenous and instrumental variables into a 
state vector and by solving this set of equations for 
the state transition. The result is 
13 
x,+l=A,x,+ X Biui+z,  (lO) 
i=1 
where  x  is  the  state  vector and  /11 the  instrumental 
vector for market participant i, i =  1  ..... 13, and where 
the  exogenous  influences  are  reflected  in  the  time 
varying  parameters  A,  B  and  z.  The  state  vector 
consists of all the endogenous variables with one lag 
and  the  producer  price  indices,  PFI,  up  to  their 
maximum  lag,  which  adds  up  to  75  elements.  The 
instrumental  vectors  have  only  one  element.  The 
objective variable of the buffer stock manager is the 
world market price. In the game exercises in the next 
two sections the producing countries or regions have 
as objective variable their export price index and the 
consuming  regions  have  as  objective  variable  their 
import price index. Since these objective variables form 
a subset of the state variables the vector y of objective 
variables can be written as 
y=Cx  (11) 
In the next section control and game algorithms are 
given for the abstract model, ( 10)-( 11 ). In the section 
after these algorithms are  applied to the  underlying 
world cocoa model, (1)-(9). 
Difference  game methodology 
The objective of the buffer stock manager is to keep 
the  world  market  price  as  close  as  possible  to  an 
a priori specified target price path by selling and buying 
on the world market. Therefore the basic part of the 
objective functional of  the buffer stock manager consists 
of squared deviations of the world market price path, 
PICCO,  from  this  target  price  path,  PICCO.  The 
interventions of the buffer stock manager are restricted 
by  the  available  buffer  stock  and/or  the  available 
budget. An optimal degree of price stabilization can 
be found by using as objective functional the weighted 
sum of squares over a fixed planning horizon 
T 
[q(PICCOt-PICCOt) 2 +r(ABSTt) 2 ]  (12) 
t=l 
A high value for the relative priority q/r will generally 
lead  to  a  good  stabilization  result  with  strong 
interventions, whereas a low value for q/r will generally 
lead  to  a  bad  stabilization  result  with  minor  inter- 
ventions. Given the restrictions on interventions there 
will generally be a best stabilization result corresponding 
with an optimal value for the relative priority q/r. 
The  objective  functionals  of  the  other  market 
participants are formulated in the same way, with the 
world market price replaced by the export price for 
the producing countries or regions and by the import 
price  for  the  consuming  regions.  These  objective 
functionals reflect the idea that, although producing 
and  consuming countries  and  regions participate  in 
the buffer stock in order to stabilize prices, there may 
be additional storage activities in these countries and 
regions in order to try to get higher export prices or 
lower import prices. This leads to a strategic interaction 
between buffer stock manager, producers and consumers, 
which can be modelled as a difference game. In terms 
of the state space form, (10)-(11),  of the model this 
difference game consists of the objective functionals 
T 
Ji( u~  .....  /113) :=  ~  [(Y,- Yl)'Q~(Y,- Y:I) 
t-1 
+u~'Riul]  i=l .....  13  (13) 
and the constraints (10)  ( 11 ), where .9  ~  are the vectors 
of target price paths and where the diagonal matrices 
Q"  are  semipositive  definite  and  the  scalars  R:  are 
positive. The quadratic form of the objective functionals 
implies  that  deviations  above  and  below  the  target 
paths are equally punished. This is a  suitable type of 
criterion for stabilization purposes.  However, in this 
game it is not the objective of producers and consumers 
to stabilize prices, but to get higher export prices or 
lower import prices. A way out is to set the target path 
of  export  (import)  prices  high  (low)  enough  for 
the resulting price path to remain below (above) the 
target price path. The precise choice of the target paths 
as  well  as  the  relative  priorities  q/r  must  again  be 
motivated by the desirability and the feasibility of the 
outcomes (see also the next section). 
Suppose  the  buffer  stock  manager  is  labelled  as 
player  l,  the  producing  countries  or  regions  are 
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labelled as players 2 ..... 9 and the consuming regions 
are labelled as players 10  .....  13. In case Qi = O, i = 2, 
....  13,  the producing and  consuming countries and 
regions do  not  act  and  an  optimal  control problem 
remains for the buffer stock manager. 
The behaviourai equilibrium concept used to solve 
the  difference  game  is  the  non-cooperative  Nash 
concept.  It  is  important  to  distinguish  between  the 
Nash  solution with only initial state information and 
with binding commitments and the Nash solution with 
current  state  information  and  without  binding 
commitments (Basar and  Olsder [3], de Zeeuw and 
van der Ploeg [25]). The first is called the open loop 
Nash  solution and  the second is called  the feedback 
Nash or subgame perfect solution. Since it seems more 
realistic to assume the use of current state information 
and  no  binding  commitments,  the  feedback  Nash 
solution is employed here. This behavioural equilibrium 
is found by solving static  Nash  games  in a  dynamic 
programming framework.  The equilibrium  strategies 
are given by de Zeeuw [24]: 
u[(x):=G~x+h~  i=l .....  13  (14) 
where 
GI: =  -- [RI]-'BI'KI+I[E,+I]-'A,  (]5) 
( 
-  1  i,~  i  1  h~:=-[R~]  B,  K,+I[Et+I] 
t. 
u, .~,+ 1  +,qt+ 1  (16) 
j=l 
13 
Et+I:=  I+  ~,  j  j  t  j,  j  Bt[R,]  B,K,+ 1  (17) 
j  1 
and where K i satisfy the coupled backward recursive 
Riccati-type matrix equations 
KI=C,QIC  + A;[EI+,]  1 
x(I  + K~+IB~[R~]-'B~')KI+I[E,+,]  'A, 
'  =0  (18)  KT+ 1 
and g~ satisfy the coupled backward recursive tracking 
equations 
gl  = -C'Q~  + AI[E[+ ,]-I(1+ K~+ IB~[R~]-IBI'  ) 
+YI+I} 
g~-,, =o  tl9) 
The  variable  x  in  the  strategy  representations  (14) 
denotes the state information at time t. In a simulation 
it  is assumed  that  the players observe the  simulated 
state vector. 
Cocoa  market  as  a  game 
In  this  section  two  strategic  interventions  on  the 
international cocoa market are compared. In the first 
a  buffer stock  manager  tries  to  stabilize  the  world 
market  price  by  selling  and  buying  on  the  world 
market from an available buffer stock. In the second 
producers and consumers take account of these buffer 
stock activities and consider intervening for themselves 
in order to obtain higher export prices or lower import 
prices. The buffer stock  manager realizes this  so the 
three market participants play a  Nash game between 
them.  In  the  first  exercise the  buffer stock  manager 
employs  the  optimal  control  strategy  u 1  given  by 
Equations (14)-(19) with Qi =0, i= 2  .....  13. In the 
second  exercise the  players  employ  the  set  of Nash 
strategies  u i,  i= 1  .....  13,  also  given  by  Equations 
(14)  (19).  Both  control and  Nash  game  algorithms 
start from the model parameters (A,, B,, z,), the initial 
state  vector xl,  the  target  paths  )Y  and  the  relative 
priorities (Qi, Ri). 
The target path for the world market price should 
reflect the idea that the buffer stock manager only tries 
to  counter  undesirable  market  forces  on  the  inter- 
national  cocoa market  and  not  the  spill  over effects 
from  other  markets.  This  target  path  is  therefore 
constructed  as  follows  (see  for  other  ideas  for  the 
construction of target price paths  Lee and Blandford 
[16];  Ghosh,  Gilbert  and  Hughes  Hailett  [10]; 
Hughes Hallett  [13]).  First,  the world market  price, 
PICCO,  is  simulated  with  the  cocoa  model  given 
above and  a  trend  is determined. Second, the  world 
market price, PICCO, is simulated with Equation (9) 
in which ~2 and :~3 are set equal to zero, which implies 
market equilibrium, and again a  trend is determined. 
Finally,  the  deviations  from  trend  in  the  second 
simulation  are  added  to  the  trend  found  in  the  first 
simulation.  The  resulting  price  path  is  taken  as  the 
target path for the world market cocoa price. It seems 
logical to use this target path and  Equations (4) and 
(5)  to  construct  target  paths  for export and  import 
prices. However, this would typically lead to additional 
stabilization efforts and not to the sort of conflict that 
we  are  attempting  to  analyse  here.  In  that  conflict 
producers  and  consumers  are  trying  to  get  higher 
export prices and lower import prices respectively and 
not stable prices. They aim at a better result than they 
would get by doing nothing. The construction of these 
target paths is  therefore based on the resulting price 
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Table 7. Optimal control solution. ~ 
ABST  Simulated  Target  Controlled 
PICCO  PICCO  PICCO 
1968  -  13.83  64.16  69.29  61.85 
1969  --41.67  86.86  78.20  79.86 
1970  --29.49  94.21  85.60  90.23 
1971  15.01  77.58  89.58  84.65 
1972  43.51  63.15  96.28  76.68 
1973  19.18  116.70  118.09  122.00 
1974  -  18.33  187.60  147.23  179.30 
1975  -  33.56  212.80  156.78  197.30 
1976  --29.36  215.20  170.48  200.10 
1977  -17.63  369.30  337.47  360.30 
1978  4.76  305.60  307.36  310.00 
1979  20.46  271.60  297.11  289.30 




-  52.29 
min {BST,} = BST77 = -6.17 
Operating costs ( US$): 59 073 000 
Inward cash flow (US$): 75 728000 
Stabilization index (simulation): 341.59 
Stabilization index (control)  : 228.62 
aThe stabilization index is defined as Z a°  ,=68  I PICCO -  PICCO I. 
The operating costs for the buffer stock manager are defined as 
80 
~[  ABST~ x  PICCOt +  (BST67  --  BSTso)(PICCOso 
t=68 
I--0.216 x ( BST67 --  BSTso) ] ) 
The first term is the total yearly outward cash flow from selling and 
buying. The second term represents the costs for restoring the buffer 
stock at its initial level. The warehouse costs of the buffer stock are 
not taken into account. 
paths  from the  control experiment.  The  target  paths 
for export  prices  are  set  10%  higher  than  the  result 
of the  control  experiment  and  the  target  paths  for 
import prices are set  10%  lower. 
The  control  experiment  is  set  up  as  follows.  The 
buffer  stock  manager  is  given  an  initial  buffer  stock 
of  100000  metric  tons.  The  relative  priority  Q~l/R 1 
is  determined  by  experiment.  The  value  of  R 1  is 
arbitrarily  set at  10.  Starting at 0  the value of QI~  is 
gradually increased until the accumulated buffer stock 
changes  just  hit  the  ceiling  of  100000  metric  tons 
somewhere in the sampling period, which happens for 
Qlll =  30. This is the best stabilization result the buffer 
stock  manager  can  achieve  with  the  available  buffer 
stock. The results are presented  in Table 7. 
The  game  experiment  is  essentially  set  up  in  the 
same  way.  The  values  of R ~,  i= 2 .....  13,  are  also 
arbitrarily set at 10. The values of Qi  i, i =  2 .....  13, are 
also  gradually  increased  starting  at  0  until  the 
accumulated interventions  on the producers' side and 
the  consumers'  side  unrealistically  exceed  a  preset 
value  of  about  140000  metric  tons.  From  the 
experiments  it is found that an increasing  Qii, which 
must  lead  to higher  export  prices  and  lower  import 
prices respectively, also leads  to more income for the 
producing countries  and  regions  and lower costs for 
the consuming regions. This implies  that prices are a 
good  indicator  of  revenues  and  costs  so  that  the 
experiment  was  set  up  realistically  in that  respect  in 
the  first  place.  It  remains  to  be  seen  what  happens 
when  both  producers and  consumers try  to improve 
their situation  by speculative actions. 
The  results  of the  game  experiment  are  presented 
in three steps. First, there is only a game between buffer 
stock  manager  and  producing countries  and  regions 
in which the consuming regions remain  passive. This 
is called game 1. Second, there is only a game between 
buffer stock manager and consuming regions in which 
the  producing countries  and  regions  remain  passive. 
This  is called  game 2.  Finally, the game between  the 
three market participants is called game 3. It is found 
that in the games with consuming regions there is more 
room for the  buffer stock  manager  to operate  in.  In 
these games the  value of Q~I can be increased  to 35. 
In  game  1  the  preset  boundary  for  the  producing 
countries and regions is hit for Qii =  6, i =  2 .....  9. In 
game 2 the preset boundary for the consuming regions 
is hit for QI~ =  10, i=  10  .....  13. In game 3 the preset 
boundaries are hit for Qil =  5, i =  2 .....  9 and QI~ =  9, 
i =  10  .....  13.  It is  possible  to vary the  values of Qii 
over the different countries and regions and over time. 
One  variation  is  to  relate  these  values  to  the  size  of 
the  trade  of  each  country  and  region  so  that  the 
resulting interventions  will also be related  to the size 
of the trade. It turns out that the market results remain 
essentially the same. The reason is that the interventions 
of the producers as a  group and of the consumers as 
a  group remain essentially the same. The results with 
these values for QI~ are presented in Table 8 for game 1, 
Table 9 for game 2 and Table  10 for game 3. 
The  first  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from the  figures 
in Tables  7-10 is that the pattern  of the buffer stock 
interventions  is the same in all four experiments.  The 
buffer stock  manager  starts  to sell  for three  periods, 
then  buys for three  periods,  then  sells  again  for four 
or five periods and ends up buying. In total the buffer 
stock manager is a  seller. The producing countries or 
regions  are  predominantly  withholding  in  order  to 
lower  supply  to  increase  prices  and  the  consuming 
regions  are  predominantly  using  up  their  stocks  in 
order to lower demand to decrease prices, which is to 
be expected. 
As  an  indicator  of the  degree  of stabilization  the 
sum of absolute differences between  the values of the 
resulting  price  path  and  the  corresponding  values  of 
the  target  price  path  is  used.  The  optimal  control 
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Table 8. Game between buffer stock and producers  (game  I).  Table  10.  Game  between  buffer stock,  producers  and  consumers 
(game 3). 
8  4  Total 
ABST  i~ ! AST  i  .  AS~  PICCO  s  4 
~1  intervention  ABST  ~"  AS~  ~  AS~  Total  PICCO 
i=l  i=1  intervention 
1968  -5.96  -5.77  0.0  11.73  62.20 
1969  -32.02  0.44  0.0  31.58  81.56  1968  -  8.29  5.65  4.86  9.08  62.83 
1970  -27.44  8.18  0.0  19.26  91.84  1969  30.71  0.94  3.06  -  32.83  81.05 
1971  9.26  10.75  0.0  20.01  84.55  1970  -24.26  8.73  10.07  -25.60  90.11 
1972  37.67  6.92  0.0  44.59  75.31  1971  12.48  10.50  -  10.14  12.84  83.18 
1973  17.98  2.81  0.0  20.79  121.10  1972  40.16  5.46  4.71  40.91  75.69 
1974  -16.08  2.92  0.0  -13.16  180.10  1973  16.66  1.06  -0.48  17.24  122.10 
1975  -  31.57  6.81  0.0  --24.76  199.711  1974  -  20.25  1.82  1.52  -19.95  179.70 
1976  30.25  15.12  0.0  15.13  204.30  1975  -  34.84  6.41  7.00  -  35.43  197.70 
1977  -22.42  26.82  0.0  4.40  366.40  1976  -29.86  14.95  16.93  -  31.84  200.10 
1978  1.55  28.24  0.0  26.69  316.00  1977  -  19.41  26.59  -  27.54  -20.36  359.40 
1979  15.90  25.16  0.0  41.06  293.70  1978  3.57  28.14  -30.22  1.49  308.10 
1980  27.68  13.13  0.0  40.81  248.20  1979  20,98  24,31  -26.17  19.12  287.60 




58.80  141.53  0.0  82.73 
min { BST,} = BSTvs=  2.38 
t 
Operating costs ( US$):  12 932 000 
Inward cash flow (US$): 122 502000 
Benefits producers (US$): 500007 000 
Benefits consumers (US$):  245 125000 
Stabilization index : 245.55 
~8 
-40.76  135.06  -  145.31  -  51.02 
min ~BSI,  "" = BSTw =  1.68 
t 
Operating costs ( US$):  32 499 000 
Inward cash flow (US$): 72712000 
Benefits producers (US$):  61 614000 
Benefits consumers (US$): 21  121 000 
Stabilization index: 230.37 
Table 9. Game between buffer stock and consumers(game  2). 
8  4  Total 
Aasr  Z Asr~  ~  AS~  PlCCO 
=  i=1  intervention 
1968  13.30  0.0  4.58  -  8.72  62.88 
1969  -35.52  0.0  -2.70  38,22  80.17 
1970  -  24.11  0.0  -  9.22  -  33.33  88.75 
1971  16.99  0.0  -9.65  7,34  82.58 
1972  43.98  0.0  -  5.13  38,85  76.25 
1973  16.78  0.0  1.49  15.29  122.80 
1974  22.46  0.0  2.34  24.80  179.40 
1975  -  36.41  0.0  -7.08  -43,49  196.10 
1976  -28.69  0.0  -16.07  -44.76  196.90 
1977  -  14.73  0.0  -  25.87  -40.60  354.20 
1978  9.73  0.0  -  28.23  -  18.50  302.20 
1979  25.77  0.0  -24.83  0.94  282.80 
1980  34.35  0.0  12.02  22.33  245.10 
'•=  -27.62  0.0 
68 
-140.05  -  167.67 
min  BST~ ~ = BST~ 7 = 2.53 
t 
Operating costs ( US$):  53 749 000 
Inward cash flow (US$): 23 950000 
Benefits producers (US$):  542746000 
Benefits consumers ( US$):  212 358 000 
Stabilization index : 229.74 
solution leads to a good stabilization result. This result 
is  somewhat  better  than  for  the  game  solutions. 
However, the stabilization indices for the games with 
consumers  are  almost  as  good  as  for  the  optimal 
control  solution,  whereas  the  stabilization  index  for 
the game with only producers is quite a  bit worse. This 
means  that  the  destabilizing effect  is  mainly  due  to 
storage  activities  in  the  producing  countries  and 
regions. 
Net sales from the buffer stock are the lowest in the 
game with only consumers and the highest in the game 
with only producers. However, this does not mean that 
the buffer stock manager  is less active in game 2.  On 
the contrary, the sum of interventions in absolute terms 
is  the  highest  in  game  2  and  the  lowest  in  game  1. 
What  this does imply is that the costs of replenishing 
the buffer stock up to the initial level of 100000 metric 
tons  will  be  lower.  These  costs  are  calculated  by 
multiplying the required quantity by a simulated world 
market  price.  In  this  simulation  it  is  assumed  that 
every  market  participant  has  to  restore  its  initial 
endowment,  which  determines  fictitious  supply  and 
demand,  and that  there are enough  buyers or sellers. 
In order to get an indicator for the costs of operating 
the buffer stock the net inward cash flow into the buffer 
stock  has  to  be  subtracted from these replenishment 
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costs. The costs of operating the buffer stock are the 
lowest for the game with producers only (game 1  ). The 
interventions  of  the  producers  induce  an  upward 
pressure on the world market price, which leads to a 
very high net inward cash flow into the buffer stock. 
These revenues outweigh the high replenishment costs 
for this game. The costs of operating the buffer stock 
are  also  very low for the  game  with  producers  and 
consumers (game  3).  The interventions of producers 
and consumers almost cancel out so that  the  world 
market price path changes only slightly as compared 
to  the  price  path  in  the  optimal  control  solution. 
Therefore the  net  inward  cash  flow  into  the  buffer 
stock is almost the same. However, the replenishment 
costs are much lower. The costs of operating the buffer 
stock for the game with consumers only (game 2) are 
higher than  for the  other two games  but  still  lower 
than for the optimal control solution. The interventions 
of consumers  induce  a  downward  pressure  on  the 
world market price, which leads to a  low net inward 
cash flow into the buffer stock. However, the replenish- 
ment costs are much lower, since a large buffer stock 
remains  at  the  end,  and  this  outweighs  the  lower 
revenues. 
The  results  of  game  1  and  game  2  show  that 
producers and consumers actually benefit from their 
actions. The pursuit of higher export prices and lower 
import prices leads to higher revenues and lower costs 
respectively. The group that remains passive has a loss. 
The differences between  the  gains  of the  one group 
and the losses of the other are due to the way in which 
the market is modelled when the market participants 
restore their initial endowments. The differences are a 
gain or a loss of fictitious traders. The results of game 
3 show that when producers and consumers are both 
active the producers are worse off than in the optimal 
control solution. This is because the attempts of both 
groups to improve their situation approximately cancel 
out so that withholding and dumping implies a  loss. 
On  the other hand  consumers are better off because 
they restore their used stocks at a favourable price. The 
values are, however, rather small. 
These budget considerations are important in putting 
the  results  in  the  right  perspective.  Although  the 
general  conclusion  is  that  buffer stock  stabilization 
activities  are  less  successful  when  producing  and 
consuming countries and regions also employ storage 
activities for their own sake, this conclusion is weakened 
by the fact that the operating costs of the buffer stock 
are  much  lower.  Furthermore,  the  producers  have 
lower revenues and  the consumers have lower costs. 
A topic of further research will be to make an overall 
cost and benefit analysis and to see if the results are 
robust  for reasonable  variations  in  the  target  paths 
and  the  relative  priorities.  Finally,  the  issue  of 
coordination through the buffer stock and conflict on 
the market afterwards could be analysed further with 
other non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretic 
solution concepts. 
Conclusion 
This  paper  tries  to  answer  the  question  of  what 
happens if agents in producing and consuming countries 
are still strategically active on the international cocoa 
market, although countries coordinate their stabilizing 
efforts through a  buffer stock manager. An empirical 
model for the world cocoa market is constructed and 
the  optimal  control  solution  for  the  buffer  stock 
manager is compared with feedback Nash or subgame 
perfect game equilibria between buffer stock manager, 
producers and consumers. The conclusion is that the 
stabilizing  efforts  are  partly  offset  by  the  strategic 
activities of the other market participants.  However, 
the  costs of operating the  buffer stock  decrease and 
some other market participants are better off. A further 
treatment  of the  trade  off between  the  stabilization 
result, on the one hand,  and costs and  revenues, on 
the other hand, and the study of other game equilibria 
are left for further research. 
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Appendix 1 
List of symbols 
BST  Buffer  stock ( 1000 metric tons) 
CC  Consumption  of cocoa ( 1000  metric tons), calculated by adding grindings and imports in bean equivalents of the 
various consuming areas.  CCRR  is obtained by subtracting the consumption  in  the other four areas from  world 
grindings. Data taken from FAO Cocoa Statistics [6] and Gill and Duffus Cocoa  Market Reports [ 11 ] 
CPI  Commodity price index (1980=  100):  data from International Financial Statistics [15] 
8 
ERWT  World supply of cocoa beans:  ~  QRj-ASTj 
j  I 
4. 
IRWT  World demand for cocoa beans:  ~"  CC~-ASTj 
j  l 
GNPR  Gross  national  product  in  purchasers'  values  in  billions of  US$  (at  exchange  rates  and  price  levels  of  1975). 
Data  available for  the  period  1960  82  for  Western  Europe  and  North  America.  For  the  rest  of the  developed 
world  data are from  Japan,  Australia and  New  Zealand  [18].  For  Eastern  Europe  and  the  USSR  the  data are 
taken from OECD  [ 19] (available as an index (1975 =  100) for the period 1960  80) 
HY  Percentage of total area planted  with  cocoa  that  is planted  with  hybrid  varieties. This  is defined only for  Ivory 
Coast and Brazil [5] 
PC  Index of consumption prices ( 1975 =  100).  For the consuming regions this index is calculated by dividing nominal 
private consumption per region by real private consumption per region at  1975 prices and exchange rates from the 
OECD  National Accounts for the period  1960  .82  [ 18].  For Eastern Europe and the USSR no data are available. 
For the producing countries data are available per country for the period 1953  84 (except for Cameroon and Ivory 
Coast) from the International  Financial Statistics [ 15]. For Cameroon and Ivory Coast data for the missing years 
(1953-62  and  1953 60  respectively) were constructed  by regressing the  index for each  country  on  the  index  for 
total Africa and predicting the missing observations. For the three remaining areas data are constructed as follows: 
the rest of Africa, the consumer index for total Africa, period 1953-84; Asia and Oceania, the consumer price index for 
total Asia, period  1953  84;  the rest  of South  America, the  average of the consumer price indices (weighted with 
production  of beans)  of Ecuador,  Mexico and  the  Dominican  Republic, period  1956-84;  all taken  from  OECD 
National Accounts [ 18] and International Financial Statistics [ 15] 
PE  Unit value of exports (US dollar cents per kilo). Nominal exports are divided by real exports in  1975 prices; data 
from FAO Cocoa Statistics [6] and FAO Trade  Yearbook  [7] 
PFI  Index of producer prices in home currency ( 1975 =  100). Producer prices in home currency are available for countries. 
For the rest of Africa a  weighted average of producer prices in US dollar cents of the four other countries is used, 
Producer prices for the rest of South America and Asia and Oceania are set equal to export prices. Data are available for: 
Cameroon  (1958-~82),  Ghana  (1953  82),  Ivory Coast  (1957-82),  Nigeria (1953-82)  and  Brazil (1966  82)  from 
Gill and Duffus Cocoa Market Reports [ 11 ] 
P!  Unit value of imports (US dollar cents per kilo). Nominal imports are divided by real imports in  1975 prices, data 
from FAO Cocoa Statistics [6] and FAO Trade  Yearbook [7] (except for Eastern Europe and the USSR, 1965  82) 
PICCO  Annual average of daily prices of cocoa beans (US dollar cents per kilo) from [6] and [8] 
POP  Population in millions, from IMF [15] and OECD [19] 
PS  Price of sugar on the world market (US dollar cents per kilo) (World Bank  [23]) 
] 00  ECONOMIC  MODELLING  January  1991 Control,  coordination  and conflict  on international  commodity markets:  W. van Groenendaal  and A. de Zeeuw 
QR  Production of cocoa beans (1000 metric tons) per annum (1  October -  30 September); FAO Cocoa  Statistics [6] 
and ICCO Quarterly  Bulletin  of Cocoa  Statistics [ 14] 
RE  Rate of exchange in units per US dollar (for regions RE equals  1 ); International  Financial  Statistics [ 15] 
ST  Strategic stocks held by producing and consuming countries 
STWT  Free world stocks of cocoa beans (1 000 metric tons) calculated starting from 1960 as reported by Gill and Duffus 
[11] 
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